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Abstract 
Previous theoretical and empirical studies suggest that CEOs’ political connections are valuable 
to firms. We examine whether such connections become entrenched if the expected political 
capital fails to materialize and the firm lacks other types of political power. Using a sample of 
listed non-SOEs in China, we show that politically connected CEOs have a lower probability of 
turnover and cause a weaker turnover-performance sensitivity than non-politically connected 
CEOs. Further analyses show that these turnover patterns are not consistent with alternative 
explanations, such as superior managerial ability, being a member of controlling families or 
being promoted from the inside. The turnover patterns are less pronounced in firms with 
alternative political power, such as connected boards or being vital to the local economy. 
Following the turnover of politically connected CEOs, firm performance does not necessarily 
undergo significant improvement. Our results call for new theories that comprehend the real 
effects of political connections.  
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A large strand of literature demonstrates that political connections are valuable to 
corporations. Theoretically, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) model that politicians cater to interest 
groups because the public is disorganized and the favourable treatment from the politicians is 
particularly beneficial for privately controlled firms. Crony capitalism also suggests that political 
leaders use their power to create rents for their families’ and relatives’ businesses. Empirical 
evidence supporting these predictions prevails both in the US and other countries (e.g., Agrawal 
and Knoeber 2001, Krozner and Stratmann 1998, Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009, Cooper, 
Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2010, Fisman, 2001, Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000, Johnson and 
Mitton 2002, Faccio 2006). For example, using an event study approach, Fisman (2001) and 
Faccio (2006) show that political connections are positively associated with firm value, which 
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) and Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) suggest arises 
from preferred access to credit, regulatory favours, and government financial assistance. Few 
studies, however, explore the potential negative effect of political connections on corporate 
governance. Among these, Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) document that accounting quality 
is lower in politically connected firms than in non-connected firms. Our study proposes a 
different perspective from previous literature about the effects of political connections by 
showing how the political connections of CEOs have a deleterious effect on the managerial 
monitoring mechanism.
1
   
Focusing on forced CEO turnover, an important corporate governance event in disciplining 
managers and enhancing efficiency (Huson, Parrino, and Starks 2001), we provide evidence that 
political connections may reduce the effectiveness of the managerial monitoring mechanism. The 
literature on managerial turnover shows that forced turnover is negatively associated with firm 
performance (Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988, Weisbach, 1988) and followed by an 
improvement in performance (Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004; Evans et al., 2014). 
However, through dual positions, managerial ownership, connection with controlling owners, or 
takeover provisions, CEOs can reduce the probability of being replaced (Chen et al., 2013; 
Dikolli et al., 2014).  
We document that the reduction in the probability of politically connected CEOs being 
replaced in Chinese non-SOEs is associated with an increase in their entrenchment, and weakens 
disciplinary mechanisms through CEOs’ credible threat of withdrawal of benefits or potential 
retaliation, which is not applicable to non-politically connected CEOs. Although the forced 
turnover of a CEO who connects the firm to resources for government financing and regulatory 
favours may risk the continued availability of such resources, the politically connected CEO 
should be replaced if he or she is destroying more value by underperforming than he or she is 
creating. Nevertheless, resentment arising from the firing process may trigger a revenge motive, 
which can be especially detrimental in countries where legislative decisions are often made 
according to officials’ subjective preferences. Hence, firms are likely to fire politically connected 
CEOs only when deterioration in firm performance is more severe than the loss of value caused 
by a credible threat of withdrawal of benefits, or retaliation by the fired CEO, or when they have 
an alternative political connection – that is alternative political capital input or safeguards that 
protect them from the withdrawal of benefits or retaliation. This argument also suggests that, as 
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 With few exceptions, the literature on the downside of political interference in corporations focuses on a political 
economy view of state ownership that posits expropriation as the motivation for government control over 
corporations (e.g., Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007). 
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in all rational games, credible threats are not acted upon in equilibrium: no firm fires politically 
connected CEOs in the absence of alternative political power. This argument further suggests 
that there is no significant improvement of post-turnover performance for firms that lack 
alternative political capital. Therefore, although unobservable, the retaliation will be reflected by 
a weak recovery of post-turnover performance in the absence of alternative safeguards. 
This premise of entrenchment due to political capital is consistent with the view that 
political connections are valuable. They in fact come from the same source – the political ability 
to mobilize resources to boost firm performance, everything else being equal. Rather, these 
entrenchments suggest that in the case of severe managerial inefficiency, firms face a tradeoff 
between losing the political benefits and improvement in managerial efficiency. The forced 
turnover of politically connected CEOs can therefore have interesting but previously 
undocumented implications. Identifying these implications can help us to better understand the 
influence of political connections, and complement existing research on the benefits they confer.  
To the extent that loss of political power is more likely as a result of firing politically 
connected CEOs than non-politically connected CEOs, we predict that politically connected 
CEOs are likely to have longer tenure, a lower rate of forced turnover, and lower sensitivity of 
turnover to firm performance. We also expect a more severe deterioration in pre-turnover 
performance and a weaker recovery of post-turnover performance for firms which replace 
politically connected CEOs, compared with their peers replacing non-connected CEOs. These 
effects, and in turn the erosion of post-turnover firm performance, should vary across firms 
depending on whether the firms have alternative political power in place.  
It is important for us to distinguish our argument about political entrenchment from 
alternative explanations for the empirical pattern in the turnover. One could argue that the longer 
tenure and less frequent turnover are due to the possibility that politically connected CEOs have 
better managerial ability than non-politically connected CEOs. However, if this alternative is a 
valid explanation of our main results, it suggests that the cross-sectional variations of patterns in 
turnover and post-turnover performance do not necessarily relate to firms’ political power. 
Moreover, this alternative also suggests an overall reduction in post-turnover performance rather 
than an improvement due to the loss of a CEO with stronger managerial ability. One could also 
suspect that these entrenched CEOs are actually members of the controlling families or internally 
promoted rather than recruited from the external managerial labour market. The analyses, 
however, show no strong correlation between CEOs’ political status and relationship with 
controlling family members or whether CEOs are promoted inside the firms, and the influence of 
CEOs’ political power holds for various types of firms. We conduct a set of empirical analyses to 
draw distinctions and rule out these alternative explanations.   
To test our predictions, we need a setting in which political connections can benefit a 
sufficiently wide range of firms that hiring politically connected CEOs is not an industry-specific 
phenomenon. We also need the setting to allow us to clearly differentiate CEOs’ political 
connections from firms’ political connections. China offers just such a setting. The Chinese 
government controls the majority of the economy through state ownership, authority to allocate 
resources, and direct interventions. The weak legal and institutional environment, together with 
the government’s dominant role in allocating resources, imbues political connections with great 
economic value. Hence, given the financial rationing and various entry barriers faced by the 
private sector, it is common for privately controlled firms (non-SOEs) to build political 
connections, by hiring ex-politicians as CEOs or board members or by investing in political 
positions for major shareholders, in order to improve access to credit, regulatory protection, and 
4 
 
government financial assistance.   
To empirically test whether political connections can lead CEOs to be entrenched and result 
in weaker sensitivity of turnover to performance, we choose a sample of non-SOEs from China 
for the following reasons. Under the current political personnel system in China, the government 
has the right to appoint, select and dismiss the top executives in SOEs, while in non-SOEs these 
decisions are usually made by the controlling shareholders, which are non-government entities. 
In this sense, including a SOE sample may contaminate the results because in SOEs politically 
connected CEOs are installed by the government, which can discourage the firing of these CEOs. 
Thus, the distorted turnover pattern for politically connected CEOs may only reflect government 
intervention in personnel decisions, rather than the fact that political connections can bring 
benefits to firms and that connected CEOs are likely to be entrenched as a result
2
. Overall, the 
selection of non-SOEs as the sample can reveal the clear and direct financial implications of 
political connections.  
Using a panel of CEO turnover data for Chinese listed non-SOEs, we classify CEOs as 
politically connected if they currently hold or previously held any official government position.
 
 
We employ three empirical strategies to identify our proposition that political connections reduce 
forced turnovers and distort monitoring mechanisms. First, to mitigate the concern that firms 
with a worse performance may be more likely to hire politically connected CEOs or that any 
variation in turnover patterns is driven by other firm characteristics, we employ the propensity 
score matching approach to construct the empirical sample. We find that politically connected 
CEOs are associated with fewer turnovers and lower turnover-performance sensitivity in the 
matched sample, in which the treatment and control samples have similar firm performance, firm 
characteristic measures, and likelihood of hiring politically connected CEOs.   
We next assess how the above relations vary in the presence of firms’ alternative political 
power. We propose that alternative political power comprises such factors as having politically 
connected board members or controlling shareholders and whether the firm is vital to the local 
economy. We find that the above patterns maintain only for firms without other political power in 
place, which makes the marginal cost of losing CEOs’ political capital higher or the threat of 
retaliation by politically connected CEOs credible. Non-SOEs that actually remove politically 
connected CEOs are found to have at least one alternative form of political power in place, e.g., a 
connected replacement CEO.  
In the third analysis, we examine the implications of political connections for pre- and post-
turnover performance. We find that the deterioration in performance before a forced turnover is 
much worse for firms with politically connected CEOs than for those with non-politically 
connected CEOs. Furthermore, the forced turnover of politically connected CEOs is associated 
with less performance improvement than that of non-politically connected CEOs.  
Furthermore, we also conduct subsample regression analysis to directly rule out the 
suspicion that our results might be driven by CEOs’ ability, their controlling family membership 
or their being promoted from inside firms. Specifically, we divide our full sample into two 
groups of CEOs with high versus lower ability, two groups of CEOs with family connections 
versus those without, and two groups of CEOs promoted from inside versus those recruited from 
outside. We find that the influence of political connections on forced turnover and the turnover-
performance relationship holds for all subsamples. This robustness indicates that our results are 
not driven by CEOs’ ability, their personal relationship with firms’ controlling families or 
whether CEOs are promoted from inside the firms.  
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In sum, our empirical findings reveal that firms with politically connected CEOs have lower 
turnover, weaker turnover-performance sensitivity, worse pre-turnover performance, and less 
post-turnover performance improvement than those with non-politically connected CEOs. 
Moreover, these empirical regularities do not stem from the endogenous selection of political 
connections, CEO’s ability, CEO family member status, or internal promotion, but rather reflect 
possible entrenchment due to CEOs’ political power. Overall, these results demonstrate a dual 
role for political connections: a valuable form of capital for firms and an adverse effect on 
managerial monitoring mechanisms, and suggest that for corporate political connections to be 
efficiently value-increasing, firms strategically need to have some alternative form of political 
power in place so that they are not induced by a particular political connection to retain managers 
who were hired for their political connections but who fail to leverage their political capital and 
demonstrate low performance. Nevertheless, it is essential to further develop the Chinese legal 
system and strengthen external governance, so that firms will have less incentive to seek rents 
from the government through political connections.  
Our study on the roles of CEOs’ political connections is applicable to other economies, as 
political connection in corporations is a common phenomenon around the world, including the 
US and the UK (Faccio, 2006). Moreover, the findings provide new insights for the literature on 
managerial discipline. Extant analyses of CEO entrenchment consider shareholder protections 
associated with the institutional environment and corporate governance structures. Our results, 
based on forced CEO turnover, suggest that CEO characteristics, such as political connections, 
are another important source of entrenchment. Further, our findings suggest that severing a 
reciprocal (political) relationship can be extremely inefficient for the party with disadvantaged 
bargaining power, and thus safeguard devices essentially ensure that such relationships function 
in a mutually beneficial manner.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background, together with our hypotheses. Section 3 summarizes the data and discusses the 
methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical results, including those for various robustness tests, 
and discusses caveats in interpreting the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional background and hypotheses  
 
2.1 Background  
 
Because the government controls most of the economic resources in China, private firms 
have strong incentives to establish political connections, as such connections can improve access 
to credit and reduce borrowing costs (Khwaja and Mian, 2005, Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou, 2008). 
At the same time, many government officials are willing to exchange low-salary civil service 
posts and the fierce competition of political careers for highly paid top management positions. 
Indeed, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, waves of government officials gave up their 
political careers and accepted managerial positions in private firms, especially in privately 
controlled firms that are publicly listed.  
While some ex-politician managers leverage their political capital to generate value for 
shareholders, some fail to do so. Such failure may be due to low ability or an agenda that differs 
from maximization of firm value, in which case it may be desirable to fire the underperforming 
CEO. However, firing these CEOs may be costly: on the one hand, firms may lose the benefits 
associated with the CEO’s political connection; on the other hand, there is a credible risk that the 
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politically connected CEO could threaten to penalize the firm in retaliation for being fired. For 
example, a common form of retaliation is to make a false charge against the controlling 
shareholder of the firm through connections in the legal/policy department. Such news 
negatively impacts the firm’s stock price and supplier/customer relations, resulting in economic 
losses and in extreme cases loss of control over the firm. Hence, firms are not likely to fire 




Existing literature has well documented the incentives of firms to stay closely connected 
with the governments, especially for privately controlled firms (Faccio et al., 2006; Wu et al., 
2012). According to the resource-based view, firms are likely to connect with the governments in 
order to be treated favourably. One of the common methods used is to hire CEOs with previous 
political experience, and the benefits associated with executives’ political connections have also 
been recognized extensively (Faccio, 2010). We argue that these benefits of political connections 
might also bring with them an adverse impact on the effectiveness of firm governance. Because 
political connections can bring a unique resource which is less likely to be substituted, CEOs 
with political connections are likely to become entrenched in their positions and thus be less 
likely to be monitored by controlling shareholders. Based on our discussion, these CEOs are thus 
less likely to be replaced, even when they achieve poor performance. Given the complexity of 
dealing with politicians and the sometimes devastating consequences of losing or disagreeing 
with them, we expect patterns of forced turnover to differ between politically connected and non-
connected CEOs. Specifically, we expect that politically connected CEOs are associated with 
empirical regularities, such as a lower likelihood of forced turnover and lower turnover-
performance sensitivity. Therefore, we form our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: CEOs with political connections face a lower probability of turnover and cause a weaker 
relationship between turnover and firm performance.  
 
Our previous discussion is based on the assumption that distorted turnover patterns are due 
to the benefits associated with political connections, and as politically connected CEOs can bring 
these benefits they thus become entrenched. However, being connected with governments 
through CEOs’ previous working experience is not the only way recognized by existing studies. 
Firms can also connect with governments through other members on their boards or their largest 
shareholders (Chen et al., 2011). Thus, we argue that politically connected CEOs are less likely 
to become entrenched if the firms also have alternative connections with governments which can 
guarantee favourable treatment by governments. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The distorted turnover patterns caused by politically connected CEOs become less 






Our sample starts with all listed non-SOEs trading on the main boards of both the Shanghai 
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Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between 2002 and 2010. The 
sample period begins in 2002 because of the change in accounting and audit standards for 
publicly listed firms in China commencing in 2001. Most tests are based on the full sample. 
However, in a few tests that require three post-turnover years to measure performance changes, 
we truncate the turnover observations for 2007. In addition, we delete firms flagged ST or *ST, 
designating special treatment due to irregularities in their financial statements and negative 
profits for two or three consecutive years. We also delete financial firms because of their industry 
uniqueness and firms with incomplete information on the key variables used in the analysis. Our 
final sample consists of 2,616 firm-year observations for 475 listed non-SOEs.  
We manually collect data on CEOs’ career paths and political backgrounds by searching 
firms’ annual reports, their press releases, and online news resources. Combining this 
information with demographic data for CEOs in the Chinese Stock and Market Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database, we compile CEO profiles that include age, gender, education, 
experience, and professional/political background. We define a CEO as politically connected if 
that individual currently is or previously was: (1) a central government official, (2) a local 
government official, (3) a military officer, (4) a member of the standing committee of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC), and/or (5) a member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC).  
We identify 637 CEO turnovers among the sample period, which amount to 24.35% of the 
firm-year observations. The reasons for 379 of these turnovers are clearly stated in the CSMAR 
database and include retirement, contract expiration, resignation, completion of active duties, 
health, personal reasons, change in controlling shareholder, arrest or being under investigation, 
educational advancement, and corporate governance reform that requires the CEO to give up a 
dual role. We classify these turnovers as normal with one exception: if the CEO is under the age 
of 60 and retirement is the reason for departure, we classify the turnover as forced.  
For the remaining 258 (= 637 - 379) turnovers not given a reason, we trace the departing 
CEOs’ destinations and identify 91 cases in which the turnover is unlikely to be forced: giving up 
a dual role of CEO and board chair in response to regulation (28 cases), and promotion (43 CEOs 
became chair or vice chair of the board and 20 CEOs accepted managerial positions in the parent 
company); we treat these scenarios as normal turnovers. Having exhausted the reasons and 
information sources for CEO departure and recognizing that firms are unlikely to publicly 
disgrace CEOs subject to forced turnover, we classify the remaining 167 cases as forced 
turnovers
3
. These include demotions (52 CEOs accepted less prestigious positions within the 
firm, and 17 CEOs left for positions in unlisted or smaller firms), dismissal (23 cases), and 
replacement during tenure under unusual circumstances but without any traceable information on 
destination (75 cases). In the final turnover sample, 470 were normal turnovers (73.78% of the 
637) and 167 were forced turnovers (26.22%). The reasons for CEO departures and their 
corresponding frequencies are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Reasons for CEO turnover 
This table reports the number and frequency of CEO turnovers in our sample between 2002 and 2010. 
Reasons for turnover Number of observations Frequency (%) 
1. Normal turnover 470 73.78 
  Retirement 3 0.47 
  Contract expiration 116 18.21 
                                                        
3
 Of these forced turnovers, 25 occurred in the first year. We exclude these cases from the performance and turnover-
performance sensitivity analysis because it is hard to measure performance over such a short period.  
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  Change in controlling shareholder 7 1.10 
  Resignation 165 25.90 
  Health 22 3.45 
  Personal reasons 35 5.49 
  Corporate governance reform 15 2.35 
  Legal dispute 3 0.47 
  Completion of active duties 11 1.73 
  Becoming  government officials  0 0.00 
  Promoted to chairman or vice-chairman 43 6.75 
  Executive position at the parent company 20 3.14 
  Remaining as chairman or vice-chairman 28 4.40 
  Going abroad  2 0.31 
2. Forced turnover 167 26.22 
  New position ranked lower than CEO 52 8.16 
  CEO position at an unlisted, smaller firm 17 2.67 
  Dismissed 23 3.61 
  No information available from any source 75 11.77 
Total number of observations 637 100 
 
 
Because any classification based on publicly disclosed information is probably imperfect, in 
our robustness tests we conduct several reclassifications to ensure that our results are not 
sensitive to the classification procedure used. First, because resignation (165 cases) and personal 
reasons (35 cases) are often face-saving reasons given for dismissal (Firth, Fung, and Rui 2006), 
we reclassify them as forced turnovers. Second, as internal demotions are not the same as 
dismissal (52 cases), we exclude these cases from forced turnovers. Finally, although we 
exhausted all information sources, some CEO departures occur with no traceable reason or 
destination (75 cases). Because these CEOs may not necessarily have been forced to leave, we 
exclude them from forced turnovers. The empirical results presented below, if not specified, are 











                    
*3210     (1) 
In the above equation, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if forced 
turnover occurred in the firm-year. Political is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for politically 
connected CEOs and 0 otherwise. Performance is the measure of firm performance, and we use 
ROA, ROS and annual stock returns as the proxies for firm performance which are entered into 
the equation separately. To capture the effect of a CEO’s political connections on turnover-
performance sensitivity, we include an interaction term between Political and performance 
measures in the explanatory variables. The control variables include firm size, leverage, CEO 
age, CEO tenure, CEO duality, board size, independent director ratio and managerial ownership, 
following existing studies (Chang and Wong, 2009). The regression also controls for firm and 
year fixed effects. In computing the statistical significance of the estimation, we cluster standard 
errors by firm both here and in all other regressions in this paper. Definitions of all variables used 




Table 2. Definition of variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Firm size Log of firm total assets 
Political 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for politically connected CEOs and 0 
otherwise. 
Leverage (%) Total debt / Total assets 
ROA (%) Net income / Total assets 
ROS (%) Net income / Sales 
Stock return Annual stock returns 
CEO turnover (%) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO turnover occurs in the current 
year and 0 otherwise 
CEO forced turnover (%) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO forced turnover occurs in the 
current year and 0 otherwise. 
CEO tenure (year) The number of years that CEOs have been in their managerial positions 
CEO age (year) The age of the incumbent CEOs 
CEO duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board 
Board size Log of total number of directors on the board 




In addition to our concern over empirical identification, and whether the results are driven 
by political entrenchment or alternative explanations, another concern in using a reduced-form 
approach is the potential for endogeneity. In this context, our concern over endogeneity is 
whether the decision to hire a politically connected CEO is related to firm performance.  
To address these issues, we first employ the propensity score matching approach. We begin 
by estimating each firm’s propensity to hire a politically connected CEO using firm, board, and 
industry characteristics in the full panel data. Then, for each firm in the treatment sample (i.e., 
firms with politically connected CEOs), we identify a control firm with the same (or most similar) 
propensity score that does not hire a politically connected CEO. As a result, the likelihood of 
hiring a politically connected CEO is the same in the treatment and control samples, but their 
firm, board, and industry characteristics might differ. The empirical patterns for the turnover of 
politically connected CEOs in this matched sample are therefore free from selection bias.   
Next, we examine how our results vary cross-sectionally with political power aside from the 
CEO’s political connections. For our sample, we proxy for these alternative political connections 
using (1) the political connections of the firm’s controlling shareholders or board members and 
(2) the importance of the firm to the local economy, as measured by the firm’s size and sales in 
the industry. First, we identify the political connections of controlling shareholders and board 
members in the same way as we did for CEOs. Second, as the non-SOEs will be more favoured 
by the governments if they are vital to the local economy, we also identify this status as 
alternative political power. A non-SOE is identified as vital to the local economy if (1) its assets 
are more than 50 million RMB and sales are more than 200 million RMB for eastern regions, or 
(2) its assets are more than 30 million RMB and sales are more than 100 million RMB for central 
regions, or (3) its assets are more than 20 million RMB and sales are more than 50 million RMB 
for western regions
4
.   






Since these measures together cover more than 90% of the sample, we conduct cross-
sectional comparisons based on each indicator separately. Note, however, that this approach 
obfuscates the results because it categorizes some firms with political power as being without. In 
addition, firms that do not have political power can hire politically connected replacements or 
make peace with departing CEOs through large payoffs; while our data identify the former, the 
latter are unobservable, which again works against our results. If a reduction in turnover is not 
due to entrenchment but instead the superior managerial ability of ex-bureaucrats, we should not 
observe that the cross-sectional pattern depends on firms’ political power.  
Moreover, we examine pre- and post-turnover performance over a seven-year horizon. 
Specifically, we document the time-series dynamics of firm performance both prior to and after 
the forced turnovers and examine the changes for each subset of firms. To capture performance, 
we use (1) return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of net income to the book value of total 
assets, (2) return on sales (ROS), defined as the ratio of net income to total sales, and (3) annual 
stock returns. If a reduction in turnover is not due to entrenchment but instead a remedy for firm 
myopia, we should observe stronger post-turnover performance improvements for politically 
connected CEOs rather than the patterns hypothesized above.  
In addition to the above indirect identification approaches, we also conduct direct tests to 
exclude alternative explanations for the documented turnover patterns, such as CEOs’ superior 
ability, CEO’s personal relationship with firms’ controlling families or internally promoted CEOs. 
We estimate the relationship between forced turnover and CEOs’ political connections, and CEO 
performance during the tenure in subsamples grouped by the following methods: First, whether 
CEOs’ ability is above or below the median level; secondly, whether the CEO is a member of the 
controlling family or not; and thirdly, whether the CEO is promoted internally or hired from the 
external managerial labor market. If CEOs’ ability, family member status, or insider CEOs, drive 
the forced turnover pattern, we should observe that the influence of political connection on the 
turnover-performance relationship disappears in firms in which CEOs have higher ability, family 
members are CEOs, and firms with insider CEOs.   
We recognize that it might also seem desirable to find evidence of removal of benefits
5
 or 
retaliation following actual departure of politically connected CEOs and to compare such 
responses across firm types. Such an analysis, however, would be contradictory and the evidence 
false. 
  
3.4 Summary statistics 
 
We report summary statistics for CEO characteristics, firm characteristics, and board 
composition in Table 3 to validate our sample construction. Consistent with the previous findings 
of frequent CEO departures in China, we find that on average CEO tenure is quite short at about 
2.83 years.
6
 Looking at the firm subsamples, CEOs in politically connected firms are older and 
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 Fisman (2002) indirectly supports this notion of losing benefits by documenting a negative stock market reaction to 
firms in which the health of the associated politician declines. 
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 For example, the average CEO turnover rate in our sample is 21.04%, implying that more than one-fifth of the 
CEOs were replaced during the sample period. This figure is not only higher than that reported by Huson, Malatesta 
et al. (2004) for US firms (9.3%) but also that provided by Kang and Shivdasani (1995) for Japanese firms (12.88%). 
It is close, however, to the 25.51% and 24% documented by Firth et al. (2002) and Kato and Long (2006), 
respectively, for Chinese listed firms during the period 1995 to 2001. On the other hand, the tenure measure has a 
downward bias for CEOs still in the CEO position because of the required cut-off at the end of the sample period. In 
regressions below, however, we find that this bias, rather than driving results, works against us. 
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have longer tenure than their non-politically connected counterparts. In addition, there are 
significantly fewer forced turnovers in firms with politically connected CEOs than in those with 
non-connected CEOs, and politically connected CEOs’ tenure is longer.  
We further find that, in sharp contrast to the US, CEO-board chair duality is common in 
China despite the Chinese Security Regulatory Committee’s (CSRC) 2004 ruling that the two 
roles must be separated: in practice, 10% of CEOs continue to serve simultaneously as board 
chairs. Chinese firms also tend to have larger boards with a lower independence ratio than US 
firms. These differences are consistent across firm types. Firm characteristics, in contrast, differ 
dramatically across subgroups of Chinese firms. Politically connected firms are typically smaller, 
have higher leverage, and have worse performance than non-politically connected firms.
7
  
Overall, the summary statistics in Table 3 suggest that CEO discipline in the form of forced 
turnover is most rigid in private firms with non-politically connected CEOs. Politically 
connected CEOs, on the other hand, are less likely to be fired and are likely to have longer tenure. 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for firm, CEO, and board of director characteristics 
In this table, we report the panel means (medians) of firm characteristics for the full sample, for firms with and 
without politically connected CEOs between 2002 and 2010 in columns 1 to 3. Columns 4 and 5 report the mean 









(a) - (b) 
[t-value] 
(a) - (b) 
[wilcoxon value] 





































































































































Observations 2616 891 1725   
                                                        
7
 We note that the lower performance of private firms with politically connected CEOs compared to non-connected 
CEOs is not inconsistent with previous findings that political connections create value. Prior evidence is based on 
individual firms’ market reaction to news, for example, about the decline in a politician’s health (Fisman 2002) or 
the establishment of a new connection (Faccio 2006). The performance numbers here, in contrast, are simple 
summary statistics that describe the data; they do not control for determinants of performance nor do they consider 
the selection issue that poorly performing firms are more likely to seek political connections. The numbers here, 




4. Empirical results  
 
Whereas forced turnover is purportedly related to poor performance and thus is a 
disciplinary mechanism, normal turnovers due to retirement, health problems, promotion, and so 
forth, are likely to be unrelated to the firm’s corporate governance. Hence, given our aim is to 
shed light on the effect of political connections on firm governance, the analyses below focus on 
forced CEO turnovers.  
 
4.1 Political connections and turnover-performance sensitivity using the matched sample 
 
In this section we begin by examining the turnover-performance relationship using 
regression analysis. Originally, we are expected to use the full sample for the empirical 
regression analysis. However, in the spirit of Boubakri et al. (2012) and Guedhami et al. (2014), 
we employ propensity score matching approach to mitigate the concern that variations in the 
turnover-performance relationship are driven by other firm characteristics rather than political 
connections. Taking firms that hire politically connected CEOs as our treatment sample, we 
construct a control sample by analyzing the propensity score for selecting politically connected 
CEOs for each firm and then matching each firm in the treatment sample to a firm with a non-
politically connected CEO. The matching criterion is that the potential matching firm has the 
same propensity score for CEOs’ political connections or, when no such match exists, the closest 
one with no more than a 2% deviation in propensity score; otherwise, the firm is dropped from 
the matching process. In particular, we obtain the propensity score for CEO political connections 
by regressing Political against a set of variables, including firm size, firm age, board size, 
leverage, book-to-market ratio, following Chen et al. (2011), Boubakri et al. (2012) and 
Guedhami et al. (2014). To validate our sample construction using propensity score matching 
approach, we conduct univariate tests to compare firm and CEO characteristics between the 
treatment sample and the control sample. The unreported results suggest that firm characteristics 
are not significantly different between these two samples, while CEO characteristics show some 
difference. Nonetheless, we still control for these variables in the regression. This procedure 
reduces 891 firm-year observations with politically connected CEOs to 608 pairs of firms in 
which the treatment and control pair have the same (or a closely similar) propensity to hire 
politically connected CEOs. We then analyze the impact of actual political connections on CEO 
turnover in this matched sample. We have also conducted the regression analysis using the 
original full sample and the general results are quite similar. To save space, we do not report the 
results using the full sample but they are available on request.  
In Panel A of Table 4, we perform logit analysis of the determinants of forced CEO turnover 
using the matched sample. While the first stage matching procedure uses historical performance, 
in the second stage regression, we are interested in the change of performance during CEO 
tenure, in the spirit of Chang and Wong (2009). The purpose here is to see whether an equal 
decline in performance leads to a difference in the likelihood of firing politically connected 
CEOs, compared to non-connected CEOs. This approach, in addition to propensity matching, 
mitigates the concern that selection per se may lead to turnover-performance insensitivity for 
politically connected CEOs. The regression results in the matched samples confirm the negative 
impact of political connections on managerial turnover. In particular, we find that the coefficient 
of Political is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is -7.88), indicating 
that CEOs’ political connections reduce the turnover rate by 35%. We also observe that the 
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coefficient of ROA*Political is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that CEOs’ political connections weaken the negative turnover-performance relationship.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we conduct robustness tests using alternative categories of forced 
turnovers. In particular, the regressions use the same specifications as in Panel A, but the 
dependent variable is replaced by (1) CEO departures due to personal reasons or resignations, (2) 
CEO departures excluding cases with non-traceable reasons for departure or destinations, and (3) 
CEO departures excluding internal demotions. As the results show, the effects of political 
connections on forced turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity are robust to these 
alternative categories of forced turnover.   
In sum, the evidence from the regression analysis supports our hypothesis that firms are 
more tolerant of deterioration in performance during a politically connected CEO’s tenure. CEOs 
with political connections are less likely to be fired, and forced turnover decisions are less 
sensitive to firm performance. These empirical relations are robust to firms’ endogenous choice 
to build political connections and to the definition of forced turnovers. 
 
Table 4: Political connections and turnover-performance sensitivity using a matched sample 
This table reports the regression results using the matched sample. The treatment sample includes firms with 
politically connected CEOs and the control sample includes firms with non-politically connected firms. Panel A 
reports regression results using the standard definition of forced turnover in the study, and Panel B reports results 
using alternative definitions of forced turnover where the control variables are also included in each regression. 
Variables are defined as in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Turnover, which is equal to 1 if forced turnover occurs and 0 otherwise  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -5.87**(-2.04) -3.35(-1.18) -3.07(-1.06) 
Political -0.35***(-7.88) -0.31***(-7.03) -0.32***(-7.06) 
ROA -0.99***(-3.41)   
ROA*Political 0.52***(2.74)   
ROS  -0.42***(-2.58)  
ROS*Political  0.38**(2.44)  
Stock returns    -0.15**(-2.00) 
Stock returns*Political   0.05*(1.68) 
Firm size (log assets) 0.13(1.00) 0.02(0.15) 0.03(0.24) 
CEO age 0.27(1.49) 0.23(1.36) 0.20(1.12) 
CEO tenure -1.56***(-12.45) -1.55***(-12.42) -1.55***(-12.65) 
Board size 0.25(0.55) 0.24(0.55) 0.28(0.63) 
Board independence 0.20(0.24) 0.19(0.25) 0.23(0.28) 
Leverage -0.41(-0.64) 0.55(1.01) 0.68(1.37) 
CEO duality -0.05(-0.17) -0.02(-0.08) -0.04(-0.02) 
Managerial ownership -1.39(-0.36) -2.93(-0.70) -3.05(-0.75) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included 
Pseudo R
2
 0.31 0.29 0.29 
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 
Panel B: Robust tests using alternative definitions of forced turnover 
(i).  Forced turnover includes resignations and personal reasons cases 
Political -0.34***(-7.34) -0.30***(-6.71) -0.10***(-4.79) 
ΔROA*Political 0.19*(1.75)   
ΔROS*Political  0.25**(2.27)  
ΔStock returns*Political   0.12*(1.64) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.29 0.28 0.32 
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 
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(ii)  Forced turnover excludes departing CEOs without traceable reasons or destinations 
Political -0.32***(-5.94) -0.28***(-5.41) -0.28***(-5.17) 
ΔROA*Political 0.20*(1.69)   
ΔROS*Political  0.34**(2.09)  
ΔStock returns*Political   0.34**(2.11) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.25 0.24 0.24 
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 
(iii)  Forced turnover excludes internal demotions 
Political -0.28***(-6.68) -0.24***(-5.90) -0.25***(-5.69) 
ΔROA*Political 0.58**(2.04)   
ΔROS*Political  0.32***(2.56)  
ΔStock returns*Political   0.28***(2.62) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.24 0.23 0.23 
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 
 
 
4.2 Cross-sectional implications of safeguards 
 
Having illustrated the negative impact of political connections on CEO turnover, we now 
distinguish this explanation from alternatives by examining the cross-sectional impact of firms’ 
political power. Departure of a politically connected CEO may possibly cause a threat of 
retaliation. Such a threat is not credible, however, if the firm has other political connections, 
which in effect serve as substitute political capital or a safeguard from retaliation. We therefore 
investigate the occurrence of forced turnover and examine how the above empirical patterns 
differ across firm types according to firms’ alternative political power.   
First, with regard to the forced turnover rate, we find that it is lowest in firms that have 
politically connected CEOs but no alternative political connection. In Panel A of Table 5, we 
present the forced turnover rate for each subsample of firms grouped by firms’ type of political 
connection and sorted by firm performance. The forced turnover rate is significantly higher (at 
the 1% level) in the lowest ROA quartile than in the highest ROA quartile for all subsamples 
except privately controlled firms with politically connected CEOs but no politically connected 
board or no vital importance to the local economy. However, firms in these two subsamples have 
the lowest forced turnover rates across all performance quartiles. For example, in the lowest 
performance quartile, the forced turnover rate is 5.08% for firms without politically connected 
board members and 5.12% for firms with no vital importance to the local economy. On the other 
hand, the forced turnover rate increases dramatically to 9.08% and 8.93%, respectively, for firms 
with politically connected boards and firms that are vitally important to the local economy.  
Second, we conduct regression analysis to examine the variations in the influence of 
political connections on turnover-performance relationship for subsamples with non-SOEs that 
are vital to local economy or non-SOEs that have politically connected directors or controlling 
shareholders, and the results are reported in Panels B and C respectively. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find that CEOs’ political connections in these firms do not reduce turnover-
performance sensitivity significantly, reflected by insignificant coefficients of interaction terms 
(though the coefficient of ΔStock returns*Political is significant). These results suggest that once 
firms have alternative connections with governments, CEOs’ political connections do not bring 
about significant entrenchment for CEOs.  
In sum, the empirical analysis in this section yields two messages. First, underperforming 
politically connected CEOs are removed only from firms that have alternative political power 
that protects them from potential retaliation, for example, politically connected boards. Second, 
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the forced turnover rate and the turnover-performance sensitivity for politically connected CEOs 
are lowest in firms that do not have offsetting political power.  
 
Table 5: Comparison of forced turnover rate in firm performance quartiles across subsamples  
This table presents the forced CEO turnover rate by quartiles of firm performance and compares them across various 
subsamples partitioned by the political power of CEOs and firms. In Panel A, we report the turnover rate; in Panel B, 
we present logit analysis on the subsample of Non-SOEs that are vitally important to the local economy. In Panel C, 
we present logit analysis for firms that have politically connected board or shareholders. Control variables in 
equation (1) are also included in each regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 













Panel A: The rate of forced CEO turnover by performance quartile (%) 
Full sample 11.13 7.20 6.84 2.97 8.16***(4.02) 
(a) Non-politically connected CEOs 18.13 9.73 10.82 4.06 14.07***(3.07) 
(b) Politically connected CEOs 8.03 4.52 0.73 0.00 8.03***(4.17) 
(i) Politically connected board or 
major shareholder 
9.08 4.33 1.78 0.00 9.08***(4.53) 
(ii) Non-politically connected 
board or major shareholder  
5.08 4.79 0.00 0.00 5.08      (1.48) 


























5.12     (1.16) 
Panel B: Subsample: Non-SOEs with politically connected board or shareholders 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Political -0.27***(-5.91) -0.29***(-6.10) -0.31***(-6.29) 
ΔROA*Political 0.52(1.62)   
ΔROS*Political  0.33(1.55)  
ΔStock returns*Political   0.13**(1.99) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.25 0.29 0.29 
Observations 718 718 718 
Panel C: Subsample: Non-SOEs that are vitally important to the local economy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Political -0.33***(-6.84) -0.32***(-6.64) -0.33***(-6.67) 
ΔROA*Political 0.30(1.20)   
ΔROS*Political  0.31(0.26)  
ΔStock returns*Political   0.27(0.99) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.26 0.25 0.24 
Observations 1473 1473 1473 
    
4.3 Implications of forced turnover for pre- and post-turnover performance 
 
We next consider the implications of forced turnover for firms’ pre- and post-turnover 
performance. In particular, we examine the time series of firm performance from three years 
before until three years after a forced turnover, the variation in performance dynamics across 
firm types, and the relation between CEO/firm type and improvement in post-turnover 
performance.  
In Table 6, we report the time series of firm performance for firms with a forced CEO 
turnover. Several patterns stand out. First, ROA during the three years prior to forced turnover 
for all firm types is significantly negative, suggesting that poor performance leads to forced 
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turnover. Second, performance deteriorates more severely for firms with politically connected 
than firms with non-politically connected CEOs. For example, ROA decreases from year T-3 to 
year T by -4.95% for the former and -2.52% for the latter, where T is the year in which the CEO 
is replaced. Moreover, in these firms, although turnovers of non-politically connected CEOs are 
associated with ROA improvement three years later (a significant 3.13%), turnovers of politically 
connected CEOs on average have no effect on ROA (negative and insignificant).  
We next link this difference in performance to firms’ political power. We find that although 
the turnover of politically connected CEOs is generally followed by insignificant performance 
improvement, ROA improves by 3.78% (significant at the 1% level) during the three years after 
CEO replacement for those firms with politically connected boards, and by 6.04% (significant at 
the 1% level) for those firms that are vitally important to the local economy. Moreover, although 
firms that replace politically connected CEOs underperform those that replace non-connected 
CEOs by -1.77% in terms of annual ROA during the three years after turnover, this 
underperformance is more than restored when firms have politically connected boards or are 
vitally important to the local economy (1.96% and 4.25%, significant at either 5% or 1% level, 
respectively). The restoration of post-performance improvement due to firms’ political power is 
thus sizable. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that in Chinese non-SOEs, forced CEO turnover is 
driven by poor performance but not necessarily followed by post-turnover improvement. The 
cross-sectional difference supports the notion that this inefficiency is associated with the 
removed CEO’s political power and potential retaliation. On the one hand, firms fire 
underperforming politically connected CEOs only when the marginal benefits of correcting 
performance outweigh the loss of political benefits and the costs of retaliation. On the other hand, 
post-turnover performance does not recover significantly as the costs resulting from retaliation 
will drive the change pattern of firm performance. The retaliation costs for the firms, however, 
are relatively marginal if a firm maintains a politically connected board or ensures that it is 
important to the local economy. 
 
Table 6: Change in firm performance around forced CEO turnovers in privately controlled firms 
This table reports the change in performance around forced CEO turnovers in our sample firms. The performance 
measure is industry-adjusted ROA (obtained by subtracting the industry median). The performance changes are 
measured over a three-year horizon prior to, as well as after, the year of forced turnover. The mean change is 
presented and compared for the following subgroups of firms: those with non-politically connected CEOs, those 
with politically connected CEOs, and those with both politically connected CEOs and boards. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We do not report the performance changes for 
forced turnover of politically connected CEOs in firms that do not have a politically connected board because, 
among the firms that have seven years of firm performance observations, there are only six such cases, which does 
not allow for meaningful inferences. 
ROA changes around forced turnovers T –(T-3) T- 
average 
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Finally, we investigate the relation between CEO/firm type, forced turnover, and post-
turnover performance using regression analysis. To avoid interactions among explanatory 
variables, we conduct subsample analysis. In all of these regressions, the dependent variable is 
performance improvement, that is, the change in ROA, ROS, or stock returns. For firms with a 
forced CEO turnover, the change in performance is given by the difference in ROA/ROS/stock 
returns between the average of years T + 1 to T + 3 and year T, where T denotes the year in which 
the forced turnover occurs. For firms without a forced turnover, employed as a control group, we 
take the end of the third year of tenure as the hypothetical turnover date and compute the change 
in performance as above. These regressions therefore require that firms have at least six years of 
data. The explanatory variables include firm, board, and CEO characteristics, as well as year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The results in Panel A of Table 7 focus on non-SOEs with politically connected CEOs 
(turnovers and non-turnovers). In this subset, forced turnover of politically connected CEOs is no 
longer associated with improvements in operating performance (negative and insignificant). 
Nonetheless, the market perceives the forced turnover as efficiency-enhancing, with a 23% 
increase in stock returns.  
The results in Panel B of Table 7 aim to increase our understanding of the impact of CEOs’ 
political connections on post-forced turnover firm performance. The subsample in this panel 
comprises non-SOEs (with either politically connected or non-politically connected CEOs) with 
a forced turnover. Of the 117 non-SOEs with a forced turnover, only 44 have at least six years of 
observations. In this regression, we include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO being 
replaced is politically connected and 0 otherwise. The results clearly show that CEO political 
connections are associated with a negative change in post-turnover performance of -4% for ROA 
and -6% for stock returns, both significant at either the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.   
Ideally, we would also examine the effect of firms’ political power when the CEOs are 
politically connected, but any further partitioning of the 44 observations results in too small a 
sample size to produce statistically reliable tests. The results in Table 7 do suggest that for non-
SOEs, forced turnover of politically connected CEOs brings significantly less performance 
improvement compared to that of non-connected CEOs and results in an insignificant gain in 
operating performance but a somewhat positive gain in stock performance. This finding is 
consistent with our hypothesis regarding the trade-off in the replacement of politically connected 
CEOs in equilibrium. 
 
Table 7: Post-turnover performance improvement across firm types  
In Panel A, we regress the change in firm performance on turnover, firm characteristics, and other governance 
variables for non-SOEs with politically connected CEOs. We report only the effect of forced CEO turnover and its 
significance. In Panel B, we regress the change in firm performance on CEOs’ political power in the subsample of 
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non-SOEs that have forced turnovers. The dependent variable is the change in firm performance over the three years 
after the forced turnover. All other control variables are defined as in Table 2. In computing the t-statistics, the 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 ROA ROS Stock returns 
Panel A: Non-SOEs with politically connected CEOs 
Forced turnover -0.02  (-0.15) -0.07  (-0.20) 0.23* (1.68) 
Other control variables include firm size; CEO age, tenure, and duality; board size and independence; leverage; 
managerial ownership; and year fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.02  0.02  0.03  
Observations 242  242  242  
Panel B: Non-SOEs with forced turnovers 
Politically connected CEO -0.04* (-1.71) -0.02 (-1.09) -0.06* (-2.01) 
Other control variables include firm size; CEO age, tenure, and duality; board size and independence; leverage; 
managerial ownership; and year fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.10  0.03  0.05  
Observations 44  44  44  
 
4.4 Alternative explanation 
 
Our main results show that politically connected CEOs are associated with reduced 
sensitivity of turnover to firm performance. Nevertheless, the observed influence of CEOs’ 
political connections on turnover patterns may be consistent with other explanations, such as 
superior managerial ability, CEOs being a member of the controlling family or CEOs being 
promoted from inside the firms. It is possible that such CEOs are less likely to be replaced due to 
poor performance, which challenges our main argument. In particular, if the reduction in 
turnover is driven by superior managerial ability, the forced turnover pattern may not necessarily 
vary with a firm’s political power. Similarly, if it is the CEO’s personal relationship with the 
controlling family or insider CEOs that are driving the results, the forced turnover patterns and 
weakened turnover-performance relationship for politically connected CEOs should differ 
between firms with and without family CEOs, and between firms with internally promoted CEOs 
and firms with externally recruited CEOs. Specifically, according to our discussion above, if our 
main results hold for both subsamples, it indicates that CEO managerial ability, CEO family 
membership and internal promotion of CEOs do not contribute to the reduced sensitivity of 
turnover to performance for politically connected CEOs. If these factors are the real reason that 
leads to reduced sensitivity of turnover to performance, we should observe that the weaker 
relationship between turnover and performance for politically connected CEOs disappears for the 
subsample of firms with superior CEOs, family CEOs or internally promoted CEOs.  
In this section, we perform subsample regression analysis to rule out these alternative 
explanations. Empirically, we divide our total sample into firms with CEOs of high versus lower 
ability, firms having CEOs with family connections versus those without, and firms with 
internally promoted versus externally recruited CEOs. In particular, we use the principal 
component analysis (PCA) to construct an index to reflect the managerial ability of each CEO in 
our sample, using the information of a number of measures for managerial ability which have 
been mentioned in the existing studies (Rose and Shepard, 1994; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; 
Demerjian et al., 2012; Demerjian et al., 2013)
8
. Then, we divide our total sample based on the 
median value of this index into firms with CEOs of high versus lower ability.   
                                                        
8
 These measures include stock returns and ROA during the tenure, CEO compensation and CEO tenure.  
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In Table 8, we report estimation results on the turnover-performance relationship in these 
subsamples. In our sample, 33.7% of firm-year observations are from firms with controlling 
families and 38.8% of these firms have a family member as the CEO. 42% of firms have 
internally promoted CEOs. As Table 8 shows, the coefficients on the indicator for politically 
connected CEOs are significantly negative and the coefficients of the indicator for the interaction 
of performance during the CEO tenure and political connection are significantly positive in all 
subsamples. These results suggest that the influence of CEOs’ political connection on forced 
turnover pattern and turnover-performance sensitivity is not driven by CEOs’ ability, their 
personal relationship with firms’ controlling families or whether they have been internally 
promoted.  
 
Table 8: Political connection, performance, and forced turnover in subsamples   
We regress forced turnover on firm performance, CEOs’ political connections, firm characteristics, governance 
variables, and year fixed effects. The coefficients and t-statistics of the key explanatory variables are reported in the 
table.  In computing the t-statistics, the standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 



















































Other control variables are firm size, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO duality, board size, board independence, 
managerial ownership, year and firm fixed effect. 
Pseudo R
2
 0.36 0.16 0.33 0.27 0.34 0.22 
Observations 621 595 256 960 512 704 
 
The key mechanism in our argument, losing benefits, depends on whether the firms have 
other forms of political power. In particular, the strength of the CEO’s political power compared 
to that of the firm. If this mechanism does indeed drive the relation between CEOs’ political 
connections and turnover, we expect the impact to be concentrated only in firms with weak 
political power. We can also expect an improvement in post-turnover performance in firms that 
have other forms of political power. Our previous analysis also confirms our main argument that 
distorted turnover patterns are driven by the political benefits that politically connected CEOs 
can bring. 
In sum, the findings in this section are consistent with our hypothesis that politically 
connected CEOs are potentially able to withdraw political benefits after a forced turnover, which 
leads to managerial entrenchment. We find no evidence that lower forced turnover rate and 
weaker turnover-performance relationship is driven by CEO’s ability, CEO’s controlling family 
status or internally promoted CEOs.   
 
4.5 Robustness and caveats 
 
Our analysis above addresses the selection of politically connected CEOs, robustness to the 
definition of forced turnover, robustness to alternative measures of performance, and exclusion 
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of alternative explanations. Another legitimate concern is whether firm performance is an 
appropriate measure of CEO performance. In other words, what are the benefits that the 
politically connected CEOs bring to firms which cause firms to be less likely to replace these 
CEOs? As the literature suggests, the purpose of hiring politically connected CEOs is to increase 
access to credit with a low cost, regulatory favours, and government financial assistance. To 
address this concern, we compare bank financing costs, government subsidies and market 
reactions to the appointment of CEOs in firms with politically connected CEOs versus those with 
non-connected CEOs. The financing cost is measured as the ratio of interest payment over the 
book value of the total debt. Government subsidies are measured as the ratio of subsidies 
received to the total sales and the information on subsidies is obtained from the Footnotes to 
Financial Statements sub-dataset of the CSMAR database. The market reaction is measured as 
the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the date of CEO turnover. To 
calculate CARs, we choose (0, +1) as the event window and (-240, -10) as the estimation 
window. We observe that firms with politically connected CEOs have lower financing costs, 
higher government subsidies, and higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) than do firms 
without politically connected CEOs. An untabulated comparison also shows that firms in the top 
performance quartile have significantly lower financing costs (by at least 559 basis points) than 
other firms. These results complement our previous argument that politically connected CEOs 
can bring benefits to firms so that they face low forced turnover and cause a weak turnover- 
performance relationship. 
 
Table 9: Comparison of benefits brought by politically connected CEOs  
We compare the financing costs, government subsidies and market reaction to CEO appointments between firms 
with politically connected CEOs and non-politically connected CEOs. Financing costs are measured by the ratio of 
interest payment to total debt. Subsidies are measured as the ratio of subsidies received from the government over 
the total sales, and the information on subsidies is obtained from the Footnotes to Financial Statements sub-dataset 
of the CSMAR database. Market reaction is measured by the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
around the date of CEO appointment, with [-240, -10] as the estimation window and [0, +1] as the event window. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 PC Non-PC Difference test 
Financing costs 1.75% 2.58% -0.83%**(-2.32) 
Subsidies (million) 53.4 26.2 27.2**(2.03) 
Observations 891 1725  
CARs 2.39% 1.13% 1.26*(1.94) 
Observations 191 398  
 
In addition, because it is possible that tunnelling may smudge the translation among 
financing cost, managerial ability, and performance, one may ask how large this risk is for our 
results. Most of our results on the turnover-performance relationship are first obtained for 
homogeneous firm or CEO types and then compared across types. Hence, addressing the 
tunnelling concern would require a proposition explaining why tunnelling differs within the same 
type of firm and CEO combination. Such a proposition would also have to explain turnover and 
post-turnover performance in a way that agrees with the empirical findings.  
One important caveat worth highlighting is that one should be careful in drawing inferences 
from the summary measures of firm performance. In particular, because underperforming firms 
have strong incentives to build political connections, lower performance in firms with politically 
connected CEOs than in those with non-connected CEOs does not contradict the view that 
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political connections are valuable to firms. Rather, the prevalence of political-business ties and 
the finding that connected boards counter CEO entrenchment, as documented in this paper, 
suggest that political connections are overall value-adding. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In countries with weak investor protection, minority shareholders have limited influence 
over management. Replacing underperforming CEOs therefore plays a crucial role in corporate 
governance. At the same time, CEOs in these countries, particularly those in privately controlled 
firms, are often politically connected as a means of increasing access to credit, as well as to 
regulatory favours and government financial assistance. Such connections have the potential to 
negatively impact CEO turnover. In this paper we provide insight into this overlooked issue by 
demonstrating that a credible threat of withdrawal of benefits or retaliation by politically 
connected CEOs makes it costly for firms to serve such relationships, even when the CEOs are 
destroying more firm value than they are creating. In such situations, political capital turns into 
political entrenchment. 
Our evidence, based on a comprehensive dataset on forced CEO turnovers in Chinese listed 
non-SOEs, supports this argument. We find that a CEO’s political connections reduce the 
likelihood of forced turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity. Such a reduction, however, is 
mitigated when firms have other forms of political power that serve to protect them from losing 
benefits or suffering from retaliation. More specifically, although forced turnover of non-
politically connected CEOs leads to performance improvement in all firms, forced turnover of 
politically connected CEOs leads to performance improvement only in firms that are politically 
advantaged. These cross-sectional variations and the evidence on post-turnover performance 
distinguish the political entrenchment argument from alternative explanations for turnover 
patterns, such as superior managerial ability, being a member of controlling families or being 
promoted internally. 
Whereas previous studies identify the value of political connections, this study identifies one 
of their negative externalities: the potential for political capital to lead to entrenchment when a 
gap in bargaining power exists between the firm and the CEO. Therefore, safeguard devices are 
necessary for the reciprocal relationship between firms and governments to function in a 
mutually beneficial way. Otherwise, it may result in inefficiency for the party with a 
disadvantaged bargaining position. Our findings suggest a very different perspective from 
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